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ABSTRACT
The goal of this thesis is to develop a tool for analyzing the risks associated with outsourcing
decisions for corporations. The thesis explores the current methods of choosing suppliers to
outsource, as well as issues and risks that need to be considered in the decision. A need arose for
a tool to standardize the process of choosing a supplier and help the decision team consider more
aspects than the bid price.
This need gave the opportunity to develop a tool based on Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
(FMEA). The typical FMEA was researched and analyzed for its ability to be an effective tool in
outsourcing risk decisions. Small alterations on the typical FMEA were made to provide a
relevant tool to analyze outsourcing risks. This new process, deemed Outsourcing Risk FMEA,
was described in detail.
The Outsourcing Risk FMEA was put to the test through a case study. The case study analyzed
Boeing Commercial Airline's 2003 decision to outsource a section of its 737 Vertical Fin
production to Korea Aerospace Industries. This study provided an example of how the analysis
could be applied. Further research into the proof of the analysis's effectiveness is necessary.
This research can be conducted by receiving feedback from teams using this analysis in their
outsourcing decisions. The feedback would then be used to improve the process. Outsourcing
Risk FMEA provides a structured, standard solution to the problem of analyzing the risks
associated with outsourcing.
This thesis was performed in conjunction with Leaders for Manufacturing graduate student
Victor Mroczkowski's MBA and MS thesis.
Thesis Supervisor: Warren P Seering
Title: Co-Director of Leaders for Manufacturing Program
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1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the background for this thesis. Section 1.1 provides background on
outsourcing, including the issues and risks companies consider. Section 1.2 describes why it is
important to consider these risks and issues. Section 1.3 discusses the motivation for developing
this risk decision tool for outsourcing. Finally, section 1.4 is a brief outline of the rest of the
thesis.
1.1 Outsourcing
1.1.1 Definition of Outsourcing and Process
Outsourcing is the process of subcontracting parts of a company to a third-party.
Virtually all areas of the company can be outsourced (except for upper-level
management). Some "functions are being outsourced with more regularity, such as
computer services, benefits administration, telephone customer support, and records
management" (Bragg xi). Outsourcing provides many benefits to companies including
"the shift from domestic to global economy, from manpower to technopower, from
company-led to consumer-driven market forces, from an industrial economy to a
knowledge economy" (Brown xii).
The process to decide to outsource varies depending on the company. Each
company conducts its own research about firms that could be good potential suppliers.
After this is done, a common part in the process is a request for proposal (RFP).
The RFP gives the supplier background information about the company and its
industry, describes the function it wishes to outsource, the specific tasks to be
taken on by the supplier, current transaction volumes, the company's expectations
for performance, and a deadline for when the RFP must be received at the
company (Bragg 15)
RFPs help the company by bringing in potential suppliers. Companies then evaluate
these suppliers based on the bids they have received and any other attributes they deem
appropriate.
1.1.2 Issues to Consider while Outsourcing'
As part of his doctoral thesis in Engineering Systems at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Pedzisayi Makumbe has been conducting interviews about the
issues that companies consider when making the decision to outsource. These issues
mostly come from the automotive industry, and were used in developing the risk decision
tool.
Cost. The most important issue is that the supplier can make the part/provide the service
the company needs within the company's budget. This issue is most heavily considered
(and sometimes the only issue that is considered) when making the outsourcing decision.
Elimination of Duplication. This issue exists for multi-national companies. Companies
do not want to be manufacturing the same product in two different places just because
they have facilities in those two places. They can outsource domestic manufacturing to a
foreign manufacturing site, especially if that site is already producing the product (just
not to the same scale).
Capability. The company is concerned about the personnel at the supplier site. This
includes having the quantity of people to produce the parts needed and also the quality of
people to understand the complications that may occur during production.
Manufacturing Capability. The company wants to ensure that the supplier has the
resources to run production of the subcontracted part.
Best Technology Available. If the supplier has a better way of producing the part, then it
is beneficial for the company to take advantage of that technology. The company cannot
possibly be the leader in manufacturing of every part that goes into its complex products.
Outsourcing a part to a supplier with lots of experience in that particular field is then a
smart choice.
1 The section is paraphrased from the research for Pedzisayi Makumbe's thesis. See References.
Quality. The company needs to make sure that the product being produced by the
supplier can meet specifications and standards.
Capacity. The company is concerned about the supplier's capacity to produce a product
as well as deliver a product on time.
Access to Customer Culture. Multinational corporations sell their products all over the
world. In this case, having a production center in a country where their product is being
sold is valuable for learning about the customer to which they are marketing.
Historical Reasons. If the company has a history of outsourcing to a certain supplier that
has met their expectations, they have a strong reason to continue their relationship.
Reliability. The supplier must be reliable in their delivery of goods and in meeting
product specifications, short from any extenuating circumstances.
Business Negotiation. Most outsourcing contracts are rewarded through business deals.
The ability of the supplier to negotiate is useful for them in trying to obtain contracts.
Logistics. The difficultly of working with the supplier, whether that be communications
or delivery, is also taken into account when deciding when to outsource.
1.1.3 Risks Resulting from Outsourcing2
Along with these issues, there are many risks involved in outsourcing. Victor
Mroczkowski is a graduate student in MIT's Leaders for Manufacturing (LFM) program.
As part of his Masters of Mechanical Engineering and Business Administration, he
developed a list of risks that are commonly associated with outsourcing. These risk were
used in the development of the risk decision tool.
2 This section was paraphrased from Victor Mroczkowski's thesis, for which this thesis is a complement. See
References.
Controllable. Controllable risks are those that a company can detect with some degree of
certainty before the event happens and can mitigate to some level. Controllable risks can
occur on the strategic, operational and financial side in all parts of the business: supply
side, company, and customer side.
Examples of strategic risks would be a relationship-specific investment for the
supply side, intellectual property breach for the company, and labor dispute for the
customer side. Examples for operational risks include supplier failure to deliver amount
needed for the supply side, transportation delays for the company, and inaccurate
forecasts for the customer side. For the financial risks, examples are supplier bankruptcy
for the supply side, higher cost of logistics for the company, and accounts receivable not
reliable from the customer side.
Uncontrollable. Uncontrollable risks are those that the company cannot detect in any
way. They include freak accidents like natural disasters and terrorist acts. They also
include political factors, such as turmoil in the country the supplier operates, exchange
rate fluctuations, new regulation and/or legislation preventing the supplier from
delivering, and financial recession. These are all factors that the company cannot control,
but they do affect their outsourcing relationship with the supplier.
1.2 Importance of Issues and Risks in Outsourcing Decisions
According to Steven Bragg in his book, Outsourcing, "the most common approach [for
choosing a supplier] is to scan through the bids for the lowest price, and immediately award the
contract to that supplier. However, this approach ignores a number of factors that should be
researched prior to awarding a contract" (Bragg 18-9). These "other" factors are the ones
discussed above, as well as many others. If companies do not take these factors into account
when making their decision to outsource, they are risking hiring an unfit supplier. These risks
have the potential to cost the company more than what the next lowest bidder with better
resources may have offered.
1.3 Motivation for This Study
The purpose of this thesis is to explore a way to aid companies in the risk area of the
outsourcing decision process, so they do not fall into the trap of choosing the lowest bidder. This
thesis is in conjunction with Mroczkowski's thesis for the LFM program, entitled Integrated
Decision Support Model for Global Sourcing. His focus is to develop an Integrated Decision
Support Model which companies will be able to use to aid their decision making process. In this
model, the strategic, operational, financial, and risk factors of an outsourcing decision are taken
into consideration. The tool provides a numerical method for deliberating these factors, and acts
as a structured tool for discussion. He worked with The Boeing Company in their Commercial
Airlines division (BCA) to develop this project.
My part in the project is to focus on the risk side of the Integrated Decision Support
Model. By using information from Mroczkowski's thesis about BCA, I hope to develop a tool
that will help guide BCA in their discussions about outsourcing. The tool I will be using is a
modified version of Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA). FMEAs are typically used in
design engineering. However, throughout this thesis, I will explore how the FMEA can be used
in the outsourcing risk framework. I will also provide a detailed description of Outsourcing Risk
FMEA, my modified FMEA application. Outsourcing Risk FMEA will be used in a case study
about Boeing's 737 Vertical Fin, as a complement to Mroczkowski's case study in his thesis.
From this case study, I will explore what can be improved upon for other uses as well as how this
will benefit companies in their outsourcing decisions.
1.4 Thesis Outline
In Chapter 2, I will discuss the background of Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
(FMEA), as well as it's potential to be used in a risk framework. The Boeing Company's current
practices are described, as a set up for the case study. In Chapter 3, I will outline the process of
developing FMEA to apply to risk decisions. This chapter will also include a description of my
version of FMEA for risk analysis. Chapter 4 will highlight a case study about BCA's 2003
decision to outsource their 737 vertical fin to Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI). This is an
extension of Mroczkowski's case study. Chapter 5 will have conclusions about the process of
this thesis and a summary of the paper.
2 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS (FMEA)
Chapter 2 includes a background look into FMEA. Section 2.1 will outline the steps taken in a
typical FMEA process. Section 2.2 highlights some of the current applications of FMEA.
Section 2.3 briefly discusses The Boeing Company's current framework for outsourcing
decisions and risk analysis. Section 2.4 weighs the advantages and disadvantages of using this
analysis as a tool for outsourcing decisions, as well as looks into similar work done in this
application of FMEA.
2.1 Typical FMEA
2.1.1 Definition of FMEA
"Preventing process and product problems before they occur is the purpose of
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis" (Beauregard 4). The technique was first seen in the
aerospace industry in 1962 as a "method of reliability analysis, risk analysis and risk
management" (Aldridge 387). It has since then broadened into other engineering
disciplines, where it has been applied to products, services, and management. Dyadem
Press has put out multiple guidelines for FMEA in various industries. They state that the
three main focuses of FMEA are:
* The recognition and evaluation of potential failures and their effect;
* The identification and prioritization of actions that eliminate the potential
failures, reduce their chances of occurring, or reduce their risks;
* The documentation of these identification, evaluation and corrective activities
so that product quality improves over time. (Dyadem 5-1)
FMEA has a step-by-step process that a chosen team follows. There are many variations
on the exact steps that are followed. The next sections provide an outline of the steps that
are seen most often in each type of FMEA.
2.1.2 Step 1: Assemble a Team
The team is an important aspect of the FMEA process. It must include a variety of
perspectives, and each person needs a solid understanding of the product being discussed.
FMEA is never to be done by one person because of personal bias. According to
Stamatis, "discussion continues until the team reaches a decision that every member
accepts and will implement...the team capitalizes on diversity among members to reach a
better decision than they could produce independently" (Stamatis 97).
2.1.3 Step 2: Complete Header of FMEA Worksheet
This step is important in FMEA to correctly identify the part being looked at. It
brings everyone one on the same page. Figure 1 shows an example of what the template
might look like for an FMEA analysis.
Figure 11-1: Sample D-FMEA Workhheet
Product Code: * -2 FMEA Revision Number:
Catalog Number: 4 Product Development Engineer:
Engineering Release Date: Independent Reviewer: 8Other Information: 9
Team Members: 10
Potential Pont PoentialI Control I Existingl Product Rconended An Rult
Im Failure Critical I CUrrent Conditionti Conw tlv Reponslbltty Taret ActionResults
momt D t( A cin sO D RPN Comments
( 1 _ 1381 4 161 17 221 1231015 6 -1 6 -T_ 1S29y127
S 20 I 1 . 28
...... , l ( !• r ,.. ... ........ _7 +
Figure 1. Example of Design FMEA Worksheet (Dyadem 11-10)
2.1.4 Step 3: Identify Design Functions
In this step, the engineer outlines all the functions of the subsystem, part or
process that the team is analyzing. "For the function to be effective, it must be identified
in detail with a statement that is (1) concise, (2) exact, and (3) easy to understand"
(Stamatis 114).
--
IProduct Description: 4 ( ) I FMIEA Date: -4 45)---~s
2.1.5 Step 4: Identify All Possible Failure Modes for Each Function
The next step in the FMEA process is to identify how the function listed above
can fail. There must be at least one failure mode for each function listed, but there is
usually more than one failure mode. "The emphasis is on the engineer who must try to
anticipate how the design being considered could possibly fail, not whether or not it will
fail" (Stamatis 137).
2.1.6 Step 5: Identify Potential Effects of the Failure Modes
The next step in the process is to identify the potential effects of each failure
mode. This step gets the team thinking about how the company will be affected by the
failure mode, which will help the team decide on a severity rating.
2.1.7 Step 6: Critical Characteristics
This step is usually for design, product, or process FMEAs. The purpose of this
column is to flag the team to a critical characteristic, such as meeting safety hazards, or
compliance with government standards. Typically, a "Y" for yes, or "N" for no is placed
in this column to indicate to the team that this mode needs to have a plan of action at the
end of the analysis.
2.1.8 Step 7: Severity Rating (S)
From looking at the effects of each failure mode, the team can generate a severity
rating score. The rating is on a 1-10 scale. An example for the severity score scale is
shown in figure 2 below.
Effect Rank Criteria
None 1 No effect.
Very siight 2 Customer not annoyed, Very slight effect on product
performance. Nonvital fault noticed sometimes.
Slight 3 Customer slightly annoyed. Slight effect on product
performance. Nonvital fault noticed most of the time.
Minor 4 Customer experiences minor nuisance. Minor effect
on product performance. Fault does not require repair.
Nonvital fault always noticed.
Moderate 5 Customer experiences some dissatisfaction. Moderate
effect on product performance. Fault on nonvital part
requires repair.
Significant 6 Customer experiences discomfort. Product performance
degded, but operable and safe. Nonvital part inoperable.
Major 7 Customer dissatisfied. Product performance severely
affected but functionable and safe. Subsystem inoperable.
Extreme 8 Customer very dissatisfied. Product inoperable but
safe. System inoperable.
Serious 9 Potential hazardous effect. Able to stop product
without mishap-time-dependent failure. Compliance
with government regulation is in jeopardy.
Hazardous 10 Hazardous effect. Safety related--sudden failure.
Noncompliance with government regulation.
Figure 2. Example of Detection Criteria for Design FMEA (Stamatis 141)
2.1.9 Step 8: Identify Potential Causes for Failure Modes
Identifying the potential causes for failure modes is as important as identifying the
effects. It forces the team to think about what events act as a catalyst to the failure. From
these causes, the team will have a better idea of how often the failure occurs, helping
them decide the Occurrence rating.
2.1.10 Step 9: Occurrence Rating (0)
After looking at what causes a failure mode, the team rates the likelihood of the
failure mode taking place. The rating is on a 1-10 scale. An example of the occurrence
score scale is shown in figure 3 below.
Occurmrence Rank Criteria CNF/1000
Almost impossible 1 Failure unlikely History shows no failures. <.00058
Remote 2 Rare number of failures likely. .0068
Very slight 3 Very few failures likely. .0063
Slight 4 Few failures likely. .46
Low 5 Occasional number of failures likely. 2.7
Medium 6 Medium number of failures likely. 12.4
Moderately high 7 Moderately high number of failures likely. 46
High 8 High number of failures likely. 134
Very high 9 Very high number of failures likely. 316
Almost certain 10 Failure almost certain. History of failures >316
exists from previous or similar designs.
Figure 3. Example of Occurrence Criteria for Design FMEA (Stamatis 144)
2.1.11 Step 10: Existing Control Mechanisms for Failure Modes
In this step, the team identifies ways the company can detect a failure mode
before it fails and/or before it is sent to the customer. This is useful for the team to use as
references in Step 11.
2.1.12 Step 11: Detection (D)
After going over the existing control mechanisms, the team rates how likely the
controls will detect the failure before the product is released to the next step. The next
step could be taking the product to the customer, production, etc. The rating is on a 1-10
scale. An example of the detection score scale is shown in figure 4 below.
Detection Rank Criteria
Almost certain 1 Has the highest effectiveness in each
applicable category
Very high 2 Has very high effectiveness
High 3 Has high effectiveness
Moderately high 4 Has moderately high effectiveness
Medium 5 Has medium effectiveness
Low 6 Has low effectiveness
Slight 7 Has very low effectiveness
Very slight 8 Has lowest effectiveness in each
applicable category
Remote 9 Is unproven, or unreliable, or
effectiveness is unknown
Almost impossible 10 No design technique available or known,
and/or none is planned
Figure 4. Example of Detection Criteria for Design FMEA (Stamatis 149)
2.1.13 Step 12: Risk Priority Number (RPN)
The next step is to calculate the Risk Priority Number. Equation (1) shows how
the RPN is calculated.
RPN= Sx OxD (1)
S refers to the Severity rating, 0 refers to the Occurrence rating, and D refers to the
Detection rating. The RPN is calculated for each failure mode. The team then discusses
each failure mode starting with the highest priority number. The highest RPN correlates
itself to the highest risk failure mode.
2.1.14 Step 13: Recommended Action
The next step in the FMEA process is to brainstorm actions that will mitigate the
risk of each failure mode. The team discusses what the company can do to improve the
RPN (lowering the number). The team must keep in mind the resources of the company.
"Example actions include DOE (design of experiments), design revision, and test plan
revision" (Breyfogle 368).
2.1.15 Step 14: Assign Responsible Person/Target Date
A member(s) of the team is then assigned to complete the plan of action. This is
an important step in accountability for the FMEA. A target date is also selected for the
team to meet again and discuss the actions taken.
2.1.16 Step 15: Action Taken
At the next meeting, the plan of action teams report their activities and the
resulting action taken for each failure mode is documented.
2.1.17 Step 16: Recalculate RPN
After the FMEA team discusses the new actions that were taken, they brainstorm
new Severity, Occurrence, and Detection ratings. They revise the RPN; it should be
lower than the previous RPN now that actions have been taken to mitigate this failure.
This completes the FMEA process.
2.2 Current FMEA applications
2.2.1 Product/Design FMEA
This is the most common application of FMEA. It uses FMEA as a way of
looking at the full design of a product and trying to find its failure modes before it is put
into its first production run. "The threshold of the first production run is important,
because up to that point modifying and/or changing the design is not a major problem.
After that point, however, the customer gets involved through...some... kind of formal
notification" (Stamatis 129). For this type of analysis, Stamatis recommends a team of
engineers (system, reliability, test, material, process, design) and a marketing
representative.
2.2.2 System/Concept FMEA
This application of FMEA is used for analyzing the subsystems of a product in the
early stages of design and provides a good check for the design in terms of redundancy.
The result of this analysis is the input for the Design FMEA. "The goal of system FMEA
is to define and demonstrate a proper balance among operational (in other words,
effectiveness and performance) and economic factors" (Stamatis 108). For this process,
Stamatis recommends a smaller team of engineers (system, reliability, test, and design)
and a marketing representative.
2.2.3 Process FMEA
Process FMEA analyzes where failures may occur in the manufacturing and
assembly processes. This helps to indentify necessary manufacturing controls before
problems cause large bottlenecks. "The process FMEA should ideally commence with
the design FMEA available...the design intent can be transferred through to the
manufacturing stage...with an already determined process route and early enough to
allow time to implement any specific controls" (Aldridge 398). The results of process
FMEA is another process, which may have to be iterated through another FMEA until it
is refined enough (Stamatis 158). The recommended team for this analysis includes
slightly different engineers (quality, reliability, tooling, process, design) as well as any
responsible manufacturing operators (Stamatis 182).
2.2.4 Application FMEA
Application FMEA is used both upstream and downstream of the product
production cycle (Dyadem 13-1). The downstream supplier side uses this analysis to
identify failures that would occur when sending the product specifications to suppliers.
The upstream side looks at customer applications of the product and how the company
can eliminate confusion.
2.2.5 Service FMEA
In this application of FMEA, the team analyzes the services available to the
customer before they are actually put in use. This is important so that the service
responds efficiently when necessary. "The goal, purpose, and/or objective of the service
FMEA is to define, demonstrate, and maximize solutions in response to quality,
reliability, maintainability, cost, and productivity as defined by the design specifications
and the customer" (Stamatis 189). The recommendations for this team are a department
head and supervisor as well as personnel involved with the service (Stamatis 208).
2.2.6 Machine FMEA
Machine FMEAs are used by suppliers to identify the possible failure modes of
the machines used to make the parts required. The supplier uses this to identify how a
product may have potential failure modes due to a machine failing in the process of
making it.
2.3 Boeing's Outsourcing Plan
2.3.1 Current Plan3
The Boeing Company has a subdivision called Global Partners that is responsible
for making outsourcing decisions for the company. Global Partners recent focus is on
developing long term strategic relationships with a close group of suppliers.
Currently Boeing's outsourcing plan includes a heavy emphasis on cost factors.
They use accounting-based cost metrics to make their sourcing decisions, while keeping
the minimum requirements for quality and delivery in mind. However, there is no one
single cost plan. For different decisions, different costs are considered. Boeing's plan
also lacks consideration for those factors that are not quantitatively measured in a cost
manner.
2.3.2 Risk Tools
3 This section was paraphrased from Victor Mroczkowski's thesis, for which this thesis is a complement. See
References.
In discussions with Mroczkowski, I have found that Boeing does have a system of
detecting risk that is based on the severity and occurrence of that risk. They use this to
control their process steps in manufacturing, if they reduce this rating below a certain
level. The design is considered successful and not looked at again. Figure 5 shows what
a risk diagram might look like for Boeing (this diagram is based on my own rendering
and not the material of the Boeing Company).
a,
Occurrence
Figure 5. Author's Example of Boeing's Risk Analysis
2.4 Potential of FMEA as Tool for Analyzing Outsourcing Risks
2.4.1 Advantages
There are multiple advantages to using the FMEA for analyzing risks with
outsourcing. FMEA is a tool that is used in many engineering applications. Boeing is an
engineering company and has probably used this tool, or something similar in the past, so
there is a level of familiarity. FMEA also has similar criteria to one of Boeing's existing
processes for risk analysis, with the severity and occurrence ratings being something that
Boeing already uses. This analysis would provide Boeing with a systematic, structured
way of approaching the risks associated with outsourcing. Currently, they do not have a
method of doing this. So not only does this method force the company to address the
risks (especially the more qualitative ones), it also provides a standard method that the
company can use across all disciplines. The outcome of the analysis is a prioritized list.
It inherently does not make decisions for the company, but instead lets the company
know which areas should be considered more when making these decisions. The team
atmosphere of FMEA is also very helpful. FMEA gathers multiple people for various
views on the product being analyzed. Instead of a decision being made by only one
person, or with multiple people in the same discipline, more employees are involved in
the decision with multiple viewpoints that will enhance the process. FMEA also forces
the team to collect data, so that they can better understand the issues. This data can be
referenced in other decisions, as well as provide justification to the decision that was
made.
2.4.2 Disadvantages
While there are a lot of reasons why this analysis would be beneficial in making
outsourcing decisions, there are also some disadvantages. The analysis has not
previously been used in this manner at The Boeing Company. Therefore, it could be
prone to rejection as it is a new analysis in a company that relies heavily on past protocol.
The process described in the second part of this thesis will probably need more
refinement to cater to the company's needs. In that respect, immediate adoption of the
analysis would be impossible. FMEA also does not provide a decision tool. It only gives
a list of factors are the most important in making the decision. If the company wants a
conclusive decision tool, this would not be able to provide that.
2.4.3 Current Ideas in this Area
There is an article about applying FMEA in an outsourcing risk framework. Cliff
Welborn, an associate professor at Middle Tennessee State University in Murfreesboro,
published an article in the Quality Progress August 2007 issue about using FMEA to help
make outsourcing decisions. He uses the same process described in Section 2.2 for a
typical FMEA. However, he argues that using a 1-5 scale rather than a 1-10 scale is
easier for the team. An example of his analysis is shown in figure 6 below.
Unforeseen vndor solection cost 2 4 2 16
Unforeseen tranition cost 2 4 2 1i
Unforeseen management cost 4 4 3 48
Lead Time
Delay in production start-up 2 4 4 32
Delay in manufacturing process 5 3 2 30
Delay in transportation of goods 4 2 1 2 16
Quality
Minor cosmetic/finishing defect 5 4 1 20
Major ctstic/finishing... .defect 5 2 2 20
Componnt will not fit with mating 5 2 4 40parts-requiring rewurk
Structural defect-function failure 5 1 5 25
Figure 6. Example Analysis of Risk Outsourcing FMEA from Welborn's Paper (Welborn 18)
While Welborn does present the initial idea to use the FMEA framework to
evaluate outsourcing risks, he does not justify his ideas to use a 1-5 scale or to not change
any other part of the FMEA process. My analysis will build upon his idea to use this, but
with the justification for the changes I have made to the FMEA process.
3 DEVELOPMENT OF OUTSOURCING RISK FMEA
This chapter goes into depth of the development process for Outsourcing Risk FMEA. Section
3.1 weighs the pros and cons of using the existing FMEA framework or developing a new one.
Section 3.2 discusses the deviations from the existing FMEA framework. It describes the
decisions made at the beginning of the development process and the justifications for the
deviations from the typical FMEA. Section 3.3 gives a detailed description of the procedure of
performing an Outsourcing Risk FMEA. Section 3.4 discusses the results a company should
expect with this FMEA, and how to use the results.
3.1 Existing FMEA versus New FMEA
3.1.1 Existing FMEA
The main advantage of using the existing framework is familiarity. In the
engineering world, FMEA is consistently used in new product development. It provides
a safety check to designers so that they can prevent obvious failures from occurring in the
product. Another advantage is that FMEA is being used more frequently in the process
side of engineering. Whether it is a manufacturing process or a customer service process,
there are now many applications of this analysis. Adding an application of FMEA for
outsourcing decisions is not as implausible with the advent of process- and service-
oriented FMEAs.
However, the distinct disadvantage of using existing FMEA is that it may not be
asking the right questions about the issues addressed. Failure modes of products are very
different than risks involved in outsourcing. A product has measurable and physical
failure modes, such as crack propagation and time to obsolescence. However, risks, such
as strategic positioning and delivery failure, do not have concrete measurements. The
question then becomes whether Severity, Occurrence, and Detection are the right criteria
to use to judge these risks. It might also be a hard adjustment for engineers working on
the analysis to change their frame of reference from product design to outsourcing
decisions.
3.1.2 New FMEA
The main advantage of a new FMEA structure is that the criteria can be redefined.
Severity, Occurrence and Detection can be altered in both the type of the criterion and
how they are scored to create a new analysis. The team can then know for certain that
they are evaluating their outsourcing decision on criteria customized to this type of risk
analysis.
The disadvantage of a new FMEA is confusion. Because engineers are familiar
with the existing frameworks for FMEAs, they would probably jump to conclusions
about how to go through this analysis without paying careful attention to the directions.
Also new tools for decision making are hard to introduce to a company because they are
accustomed to practicing a certain type of decision making.
3.2 Development of Outsourcing Risk FMEA
3.2.1 Decision
After weighing the advantages and disadvantages, I decided to create an
Outsourcing Risk FMEA that held true to the existing FMEA framework, but with some
minor changes. This decision was a compromise between the two ideas presented above.
Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 describe the similarities to existing FMEA frameworks and the
small changes made for the Outsourcing Risk FMEA.
3.2.2 Criteria
As an exercise to make the decision of how to format this analysis, I took myself
through the process of what needs to be considered when making outsourcing decisions.
I decided to look at three risks: political turmoil in country of production, quality of
produced part not within specifications, and delivery not on time. Appendix A outlines
my thought process in analyzing these three risks. I thought about what questions needed
to be asked about these issues. Looking over the questions being asked about this these
issues, I saw some underlying themes. First off, these risks needed to be measured with
by the degree of consequences that resulted. Another theme was how frequently the risk
happened. A very serious risk that happened less frequently would possibly not need as
much consideration as a less serious risk that occurred very often. There was also a
theme of having the information to understand the consequences of these risks.
These general themes coincided well with the criteria of existing FMEA. This
made my decision very easy. I decided to use the same criteria for this analysis. The
only area of some dispute was with the Detection criterion. For product FMEA,
Detection refers to the company's ability to expose a failure before it gets to the
customer. The company can detect failure modes in products by performing tests and by
setting up controls. However, it is very difficult to detect an outsourcing risk before it
happens. Controllable risks, such as labor relations or poor quality products, are a little
easier to anticipate. Controls can be set to mitigate these risks (e.g. quality checks in
production lines). However, with uncontrollable risks, such as natural disasters, it is
extremely hard to perceive when these risks might occur.
For these reasons, the Detection criterion of the typical FMEA was reformatted
for the Outsourcing Risk FMEA. In this analysis, the Detection criterion refers to a level
of knowledge of the consequences. The team members performing the FMEA will think
about their current level of understanding, as well as the availability of information to
enhance their level of understanding. If they do not know a lot about the effects of a risk,
and the information is not easy to obtain, that risk will have a high Detection rating. This
criterion is aligned better with outsourcing risks than the old Detection criterion. The old
version dealt with the company's ability to see the failure after the product existed in
some form. The new criterion deals with the company's ability to foresee the
consequences of risks. This aligns with the idea of this analysis being done prior to the
outsourcing decision.
3.2.3 Process
When looking at the process for the existing FMEA, it was relatively
straightforward. Most of the steps made sense in terms of thinking about outsourcing
risks. The only steps that did not make sense occurred at the end. The goal of product
FMEA is to identify the main failure modes and mitigate them. The existing FMEA calls
for the team to appoint a person in charge of mitigating the failure mode. The team then
meets again at an agreed time and decides on a new RPN for the failure mode. The
Outsourcing Risk FMEA is performed before the outsourcing decision is made. The risks
discussed are not realized. Therefore, it would be difficult to completely mitigate these
risks, especially those that are uncontrollable (i.e. natural disasters, terrorism, etc.).
Furthermore, the goal of Outsourcing Risk FMEA is only to figure out which risks need
to be considered heavily in the outsourcing decision. Because of these differences, I
decided to reformat the last steps of FMEA.
Instead of the typical mitigation and reevaluation, I choose to reorganize the
FMEA worksheet. The first table is called the Prioritization Table. Figure 7 shows the
table. Appendix B also contains both tables developed for Outsourcing Risk FMEA. It
uses the first half of the FMEA framework, and then stops after the RPN has been
calculated.
Team Members: .
Name of Part to be Outsourced:
Name of Considered Supplier:
.... . .. . .. ..  ... . ... . ... ... . . ......  .... . . .. i ... . . . .. .. .... .÷i ... .. . ...... ..
PRIORIZATION TABLE
Issues
(Controllable,
Uncontrollable)
Risk (based
on issues)
. ... ....... .... ...........  -- --
Causes
of Risks
.. . .... . .. ...... 
Effects
of Risk
1 .... . ... . ........ .. .- - -
Severity Occurrence
(0)
Figure 7. Outsourcing Risk FMEA Prioritization Table for Risk Analysis
At this point in the regular analysis a person would be assigned to mitigate the
risks. However, in my modified analysis, the team moves on to the next table.
This is the Mitigation Table, shown in figure 8.
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Detection
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Team Members:
Name of Part to be Outsourced:
Name of Considered Supplier:
MITIGATION TABLE
Prioritized List
Plan of Action
(without
considering
resources)
Feasibility of
Plan of Action
Figure 8. Outsourcing Risk FMEA Mitigation Table for Risk Analysis
This table lists the risks in order of highest RPN to lowest RPN. After listing, the
team brainstorms all possible ways to mollify those risks, not taking the company's
resources into account. By not taking the company's resources into account, the ideas
will be the best conceivable plans of actions, not the best just for the company. After
coming up with these actions, the team decides which of the actions are feasible based on
the company's resources. The number of feasible mitigations will help the team decide
the potential of this supplier.
3.3 Outsourcing Risk FMEA Procedure Description
Appendix C provides an instructional description of this procedure.
3.3.1 Step 1: Gather Team
The team is an essential part in this FMEA process. The company needs to
assemble cross-discipline members that will be affected by the outsourcing decision.
This includes supply chain analysts, design engineers for the product, assembly line
engineers, budgeters, and people who understand the company's global positioning
strategy (usually upper management). The team is not limited to these people. It would
also be beneficial to have members from the company's suppliers on the team. These
people would help the team understand the relationship the company has with its current
....... ......
suppliers. However, having members of the supplier being analyzed is not beneficial, as
they would probably create a conflict of interests. Having customer representatives on
the team is also helpful; they can provide the downstream insight on how they would be
affected if these risks were to occur.
3.3.2 Step 2: Identify Issues
The next step in the process is to identify issues that are associated with
outsourcing. These issues are similar to the ones discussed in the introduction of this
thesis. In identifying these issues, both controllable and uncontrollable events are looked
at. Each issue is listed in the first column of Prioritization Table. Figure 9 shows this
table with the first column highlighted. It is the first tool of the Outsourcing Risk FMEA.
This table will help organize the thoughts of the team and keep them on track with the
analysis.
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Figure 9. Prioritization Table with Highlighted Issues Column
Controllable issues, as discussed in Section 1.1.3, are any issues that can be
mitigated easily. They include issues in the following 4 categories, but are not limited to
them: cost, quality (technology, experience, reputation), delivery (capacity, reliability)
and collaboration (communication, culture, information transfer).
Uncontrollable issues, also discussed in Section 1.1.3, are those that the company
cannot foresee and cannot regulate. They do not have specific categories that they fall
under, but include such things as natural disasters, acts of terrorism, exchange rate
fluctuations, etc.
When identifying issues, it is important to keep in mind the supplier that is being
analyzed. The issues identified should be consistent with what to expect. Some issues,
such as quality failure, need to be universally addressed. However issues like natural
disasters do not need to be considered if the supplier is in a mild climate.
3.3.3 Step 3: Identify Risks
The next step is to then identify specific risks associated with these issues. Each
issue may have a different number of risks associated with it. For example, with the
quality issue, an acceptable risk may be "part does not meet specifications." However,
the risks of "machine tools are obsolete" and "plant does not have experience in
producing this part" may also fall under the quality issue. For this supplier, there is more
than one risk for the quality issue.
Another important point is that the risk associated with the issues must be relevant
to the supplier. For example the risk of "hurricane destroying the plant" is not a relevant
risk to the natural disaster issue if the plant is located in a desert area. These risks are
placed in the next column of the Prioritization Table, highlighted in figure 10.
PRIORIZATION TABLE
Issues
(Controllable,
Uncontrollable)
Quality
Natural Disaster
Risk (based
on issues)
(1) part does
not meet
specifications
(2) machine
tools out of
date
(3) supplier
does not
have
expenience
(1) Hurricane
destroys plant
Figure 10. Prioritization Table with Highlighted Risk Column
3.3.4 Step 4: Identify Causes of Risks
The next step is to identify the causes of the risks that were just brainstormed.
There may be multiple causes for each risk. They are placed in the third column of the
Prioritization Table, highlighted in figure 11. The purpose of identifying the causes is to
get the group thinking about what they already know and understand about the risks. The
causes will also help the team come up with ways to mitigate the risks in the later section
of the analysis. As an example, "product not up to specifications" could be caused by
inaccurate tooling, where "inaccurate tooling" would be placed in the causes of risk
column as well as any other potential cause.
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Issues
(Controllable,
Uncontrollable)
Quality
Risk (based
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(1) part does
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specifications
Causes of Risks
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Figure 11. Prioritization Table with the Causes of Risk Column Highlighted
3.3.5 Step 5: Identify Effects if Risk Occurs
In the fourth column, the effects of the risks are listed. This column is highlighted
in figure 12. By identifying these risks, the team is more prepared to make decisions
regarding the criteria of FMEA. They can reference these effects in their discussion of
Severity, Occurrence and Detection. An example of a risk for "product does not meet
specifications" could be parts do not fit correctly into larger assembly. "Parts do not fit
correctly into larger assembly" would be written in the effects column.
PRIORIZATION TABLE
Issues
(Controllable,
Uncontrollable)
Quality
Risk (based
on issues)
(1) part does
not meet
specifications,
Causes of Risks
inaccurate tooling,
faulty controls,
wrong design sent,
wrong interpretation
of esign
Effects of Risk
parts do not fit
correctly into larger
assembly, need to
get rid of already
produced parts,
production stalls
more complex
Figure 12. Prioritization Table with Effects of Risk Column Highlighted
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PRIORIZATION TABLE
3.3.6 Step 6: Severity Rating (S)
In the next column, the team rates the severity of the effects of the risk. This
column is highlighted in figure 13, with this particular risk's score.
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Issues
(Controllable,
Uncontrollable)
Quali8
Risk (based
on issues)
(1) part does
not meet
specifications
Causes of Risks
inaccurate tooling,
faulty controls,
wrong design sent,
wrong interpretation
of desi
Effects of Risk
parts do not fit
correctly into larger
assembly, need to
get rid of already
produced parts,
production stalls
more complex
Figure 13. Prioritization Table with Severity Column Highlighted
The Severity rating is ranked on a scale from 1-10. The meaning of each point
scale is shown in figure 14. The numbers that are not specifically defined fall between
those that are defined; they are up to the team's discretion. For example, "part does not
meet specifications" may have a severity rating of 9 because the part produced will not
sync with the assembled product, so all of the produced parts must be discarded.
Rating Meaning
1 company is not affected
2
3 company minimally affected, repaired easily
4
5 company affected, but repairable
6
7
8 company largely affected, repairable, but difficult
9
10 company is affected beyond repair
Figure 14. Severity Rating for Outsourcing Risk FMEA
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3.3.7 Step 7: Occurrence Rating (0)
In the sixth column of the Prioritization Table, the team evaluates the likelihood
of the risk occurring. This column is highlighted in figure 15, with this particular
risk's score.
PRIORIZATION TABLE I
Issues
(Controllable,
Uncontrollable)
Quality
Risk (based
on issues)
(1) part does
not meet
specifications
Causes of Risks
inaccurate tooling,
faulty controls,
wrong design sent,
wrong interpretation
ro design _
Effects of Risk
parts do not fit
correctly into larger
assembly, need to
get rid of already
produced parts,
production stalls
more comolex
Severity
(s)
9
Occurrence
(0)2
2
De
(D)
Figure 15. Prioritization Table with Occurrence Column Highlighted
The Occurrence rating is ranked on a scale from 1-10. The meaning of each point
scale is shown in figure 16. The numbers that are not specifically defined fall between
those that are defined; they are up to the team's discretion. For example "part does not
meet specifications" may have an occurrence rating of 2, because it is relatively unlikely
that the plant would produce all parts not within specifications. Some parts may be
incorrectly produced, but every part is unlikely to not be within specifications.
Rating Meaning
1 occurs very minimally (Probability < 0.10)
2 0.10 < Probability < 0.17
3 occurs a little amount (0.17 < Probability< 0.25)
4 0.25 < Probability < 0.32
5 occurs a substantial amount (0.32 < Probability < 0.40)
6 0.40 < Probability < 0.45
7 0.45 < Probability < 0.50
8 occurs rather frequently (0.5 < Probability < 0.55)
9 0.55 < Probability < 0.62
10 occurs very frequently (Probability > 0.7)
Figure 16. Occurrence Rating Outsourcing Risk FMEA
3.3.8 Step 8: Detection Rating (D)
The next column is where the team brainstorms the Detection rating. This column
is highlighted in figure 17 with this particular risk's score.
DDIotDf7ATIf't TADI C!I ~ U E~I~ I ~
Issues
(Controllable,
Uncontrollable)
Quality
Risk (based
on issues)
(1) part does
not meet
§specifications
Causes of Risks
inaccurate tooling,
faulty controls,
wrong design sent,
wrong interpretation
Effects of Risk
parts do not fit
correctly into larger
assembly, need to
get nd of already
produced parts,
production stalls
mnr r mnin•y
Figure 17. Prioritization Table with Detection Column Highlighted
This rating departs from traditional FMEA. The Detection rating refers to the
company's ability to properly identify the risks they are discussing. The panel must
reflect on their own level of understanding of the risk being analyzed and whether they
have the information to understand it fully. In order to be completely certain, the
company must already have the information necessary to make an informed decision
about the risks involved. The criterion is ranked on a 1-10 scale, defined in figure 18.
The numbers that are not specifically defined fall between those that are defined; they are
up to the team's discretion. For example, "part does not meet specifications" may have a
detection rating of 9 because the team would not have the knowledge to know if the
supplier they are looking at would cause error in the production of every part. There is
probably some error the team can assume will occur, but there is virtually no way of
knowing if the supplier will ruin all the parts.
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Rating Meaning
1 certain understanding, already have available information
2
3 fair understanding, do not have information, fairly easy to obtain
4
5 mediocre understanding, do not have information, obtainable, but slightly difficult
6
7
8 unclear understanding, do not have information, will be rather difficult to obtain
9
10 no understanding, do not have information, not available
Figure 18. Detection Rating for Outsourcing Risk FMEA
3.3.9 Step 9: Calculate Risk Priority Number (RPN)
The last column of the Prioritization Table lets the team calculate the RPN, shown
in figure 19, with this particular risk's RPN. Equation (1) is how to calculate the RPN,
where S is the Severity rating, O is the Occurrence rating, and D is the Detection rating.
RPN = Sx OxD (1)
This formula yields RPN values from 1-1000.
PRIORIZATION TABLE
Issues
(Controllable,
Uncontrollable)
Quality .. ......
Risk (based
on issues)
(1) part does
not meet
specifications
Causes of Risks
inaccurate tooling,
faulty controls,
wrong design sent,
wrong interpretation
of design
Effects of Risk
parts do not fit
correctly into larger
assembly, need to
get nrid of already
produced pans,
production stalls ...
more complex
Figure 19. Prioritization Table with RPN Column Highlighted
3.3.10 Step 10: Prioritize
The next step in the Outsourcing Risk FMEA is to move to the risks to the
Mitigation Table. In the first column of the table, the team will list the risks in order of
Severity Occurrence
(Q)
Detection
(D) RPN
162
(0) ,
highest RPN to lowest RPN. The column is highlighted in figure 20. This allows to the
team to look at the highest priority risks first.
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Figure 20. Mitigation Table with Prioritized List Column Highlighted
3.3.11 Step 11: Plan of Action
In the next column of the Mitigation Table, the team will brainstorm all possible
ways to eliminate each risk. The column is highlighted in figure 21. The resources of the
company are not taken into account so that no idea is discounted and that the best
possible ideas are put forward. To continue the example, for the "part does not meet
specifications risk" a possible plan of action would be to send a representative from the
company to the supplier to provide support for the supplier in order to meet the
specifications. Another plan of action would be to disable the outsourcing relationship.
MITIGATION TABLE
Prioritized List
(162) part does
not meet
specifications
( n1n)1 hi irric ana
Plan of Action
(without
considering
resources)
send employee to
help plant get on
track
find another plant
to receive parts
from
Figure 21. Mitigation Table with Plan of Action Column Highlighted
3.3.12 Step 12: Analyze Feasibility
In the final column of the Mitigation Table, the team will discuss the feasibility of
each plan of action. Now, the team can take into account the company's resources, and
whether the company can allocate those resources to this cause. In this column,
highlighted in figure 22, the team would write out whether they think each plan of action
is feasible and how. As a conclusion to our example, sending a company representative
to the supplier would be pretty feasible. It would just force the company to reallocate
some of their personnel. However, disabling their relationship with the company would
not be very feasible as they would have to scramble to find another supplier.
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Figure 22. Mitigation Table with Feasibility of Plan Action Highlighted
3.3.13 Step 13: Review Analysis
The last step in the process is to review the feasible actions. If there are enough
feasible actions to mitigate the risks, then this supplier should be further considered for
an outsourcing relationship. However, if the team finds that there are too many risks that
are not able to be mitigated, then the supplier either needs to provide more information,
or it can be taken off the list of consideration.
3.4 How to Use Results of Analysis
At the end of this process, the team should expect to have a deeper understanding of the
risks they are taking when outsourcing to the supplier in question. They will also know which
risks they will be able to mitigate and which risks require additional resources. The team will
have a good indication of whether this supplier will be able to perform to their requirements.
The important aspect of the results is that they do not make the decision for the team. They are
merely used a discussion tool. There are many other factors other than risks that need to be
taken into account when making the decision to outsource, including financials, strategy, and
operations. In coordination with Victor's process, the team can use this analysis to complete the
qualitative discussion of risk.
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4 CASE STUDY: BOEING 737 VERTICAL FIN
This chapter applies the Outsourcing Risk FMEA to a Case Study about Boeing's decision to
outsource their 737 vertical fin. The case is a demonstration of how to use this technique in
practice. Because it is performed by me and not a team of individuals, it is not a full scale
example. Section 4.1 gives the background of the case as explained by Mroczkowski's thesis.
Section 4.2 presents the issues that Mroczkowski analyzes in his thesis. Section 4.3 lays out the
rationale behind the rankings for the risks associated with the issues in section 4.2. Section 4.4
discusses what the feasibility section means in terms of this analysis. Section 4.5 analyzes how
effective the case study was and areas for improvements.
4.1 Background of Case4
The vertical fin component of the Boeing 737 commercial airplane is used as the vertical
stabilizer for the aircraft. In the 737, the fin is made of an aluminum structure using techniques
dating back to the WWII era. In 1988-89, Boeing awarded Xi'an Aircraft Company (XAC) a
contract to produce these vertical fins in China. XAC proved to be a reliable manufacturer,
delivering their 10 00th vertical fin to Boeing in 2004. On October 28, 2003, Boeing announced
that Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) would also be producing vertical fins. This decision was
born out of a $313M deal with Korea to bring production to their country and the sale of 40 F-15
aircrafts.
This case study focuses on recreating BCA's 2003 decision to outsource to KAI. It will
outline the risks associated with the issues that Mroczkowski has analyzed as part of his
Integrated Decision Support Model. The study is an example of how Boeing could use
Outsourcing Risk FMEA in conjunction with the Integrated Decision Support Model to help
make their outsourcing decision.
4.2 Issues in Cases
Mroczkowski presents several issues in the case. They are described below for reference.
These issues will be used in the third step of the Outsourcing Risk FMEA for this case.
4 This section was paraphrased from Victor Mroczkowski's thesis, for which this thesis is a complement. See
References.
5 See above.
Technology Clockspeed. This refers to how fast the technology of producing a new part
can change.
Product/Process Architecture. This refers to how modular, complex and flexible the
design of the product is. The more modular, less complex, and more flexible (in terms of
the design being able to support change) the design is, the easier it will be to modify if
necessary.
Supply Base Characteristics. This refers to different attributes of the supplier that may
be taken into consideration. This includes the supplier's capability, their power in
industry, and the downstream relationships they have with their own suppliers.
Enterprise Characteristics. These are the characteristics of the company looking to
outsource. The company must consider their own knowledge of the part being
outsourced, and their competitive position.
Customer Value. These are issues the customer is concerned with, including their
preference for a domestic versus foreign goods, and the economic value of outsourcing
for the customer.
Exogenous Forces. These are forces that the company cannot control easily. They
include foreign market access and political forces.
Demand Forecast Accuracy. This refers to how precise the company is at predicting the
demand for their product.
Velocity. This refers to how fast the product can be produced.
Quality. This refers to the suppliers ability to meet company specifications and
standards.
Delivery. This is the supplier's ability to deliver their product on time.
Capacity. This takes the resources of the supplier into account, and their ability to
product the amount needed.
Production Cost per Unit. This asks the question of whether there is a lower cost
associated with production for outsourcing the particular product.
Transportation/Logistics Cost. This refers to the additional cost acquired by having to
ship the manufactured product to the assembly plant.
Investment Cost. This refers to how much the company needs to invest in order to get the
supplier on track with their process and provide support.
Supplier Management Cost. This refers to the cost of managing the supplier on a daily
basis. Personnel will probably have to be redirected to deal solely with a new supplier.
Tax Impact. This refers to the tax of the county where the product is made, as well as tax
impacts on any shipping.
Supply/Dependency Risk. This refers to any risks associated with the supply side (e.g.
labor disputes, knowledge and capacity dependence, inventory holding, supplier
bankruptcy, etc.).
Enterprise System Breakdown. This refers to any risks that would affect the company,
including intellectual property breaches.
Uncontrollable Risks. This refers to any risk the company does not have the ability to
detect and/or control.
43 Risks Associated with Issues and the Logic for their Severity, Occurrence and Detection
Rating
The completed Outsourcing Risk FMEA worksheets for this case are available in
Appendix D. The following sections discuss the justification for the risks' ratings.
4.3.1 Better Fabrication Technology Emerges
Severity (9). It would be very hard initially for the company to stack up to the
competition.
Occurrence (1). The technology for making aluminum fins has been modified
consistently over the years and is now well established. A new innovation is not likely to
occur.
Detection (2). BCA would have ample resources to find out about emerging technology,
if they are not innovating themselves.
4.3.2 KAI Does Not Produce Correct Parts RPN = 100
Severity (10). If the wrong parts are produced, BCA would have to rely on their reserves,
which will eventually run out if not replaced.
Occurrence (2). While this may occur in small doses, large production of incorrect parts
in unlikely to occur. BCA would be on top of fixing the problem immediately.
Detection (5). BCA would be able to analyze KAI's ability to produce the correct part,
but they would not be able to forecast extenuating circumstances.
4.3.3 KAI Unable to Handle Complexity
Severity (8). This problem could be mitigated by BCA. However, it would be severe if
KAI was unable to handle the complexity of the fin.
Occurrence (2). The fin is not as complex because there are less precise tolerances.
Detection (2). BCA should have done good analysis of KAI's ability to handle a
complex part.
4.3.4 KAI Does Not Have the Capabilities to Produce
Severity (10). This would result in BCA not being able to continue their assembly of the
product.
Occurrence (1). This is tied with detection. BCA would not source to a company that
they knew did not have the capabilities.
Detection (1). BCA would have accurate data to determine if KAI had capabilities before
making their decision to use them.
4.3.5 KAI's Downstream Supply Base Fails
Severity (7). This would be relatively severe in that KAI would have to scramble to find
other suppliers.
Occurrence (4). KAI's suppliers do have a small chance of failing in some way. This
could be as severe as bankruptcy, or less serious as in failing to deliver goods on time.
Detection (9). BCA would have a hard time trying to find valid information on all of
KAI's own supply base.
4.3.6 Competitive Pricing for Product Makes Manufacturing Unaffordable
Severity (6). This would be severe initially in that it would drastically affect the
production budget, but the fin could be redesigned.
Occurrence (1). The aluminum fin has been very established in how it is made and
designed; therefore competition would not be breaking too many barriers. Also, there is
not much competition in the design of this part.
Detection (3). BCA would have a good idea of new innovations in the area, but some
details may be top secret.
4.3.7 Customers Do Not Want Outsourced Parts
Severity (5). This is slightly severe in that the customer may reject the final product if
they know that the fin was outsourced.
Occurrence (4). Customers may not trust the reliability of an outsourced fin, so they may
be more inclined to reject it.
Detection (2). BCA has a good handle on what their customers want.
4.3.8 Korea Shuts Production Down
Severity (10). This would fully stop production of the fin.
Occurrence (1). Korea has incentives to keep the plant open for jobs and the economy,
as well as the contractual deal with BCA.
Detection (1). BCA does have connections with Korean government due to their recent
contract.
4.3.9 KAI Cannot Meet Demand for Product
Severity (7). This would slow production and the customers would not be happy about
not having their demands met.
Occurrence (2). BCA would evaluate KAI's potential before choosing them. Short of
extenuating circumstances, KAI should be able to meet the demand.
Detection (4). This is part of the research done about the company. Boeing would have
knowledge about KAI's production rates, but not about uncontrollable circumstances that
might effect production.
4.3.10 KAI Production Time Increases
Severity (3). BCA has a large amount of backup fins to use until the production time can
be brought down again.
Occurrence (7). Some variability in production time is to be expected from KAI.
Detection (4). BCA has some idea of KAI's ability to produce, but again, they cannot
account for all circumstances.
4.3.11 Batch of Parts Does Not Meet Design Specifications
Severity (4). Because it is only a batch of parts, the entire assembly would not be
affected. It is only affected until the defect was fixed.
Occurrence (8). Small errors do occur frequently in production.
Detection (2). BCA would be expecting these errors to occur.
4.3.12 KAI Fails to Deliver On Time
Severity (5). BCA can move into their backup fins until KAI is back on track.
Occurrence (6). There will definitely be instances where KAI fails to deliver, but not
terribly frequently.
Detection (3). BCA would be able to have some sort of delivery statistics on KAI.
4.3.13 KAI Does Not Have the Resources to Produce
Severity (8). Production would cease, however BCA could help them acquire the
necessary resources.
Occurrence (1). Again, tied with detection, BCA would not outsource to a company that
did not have enough resources.
Detection (1). BCA would analyze these resources beforehand.
4.3.14 Costs Increase Quickly
This risk applies to the production cost, logistics cost, investment cost, and
supplier management cost issues.
Severity (4). This is not as severe because BCA could redo their budget from other areas
of the program.
Occurrence (8). Variability in costs is to be expected.
Detection (2). BCA's budget is continually being updated.
4.3.15 New Tariff Raised on Imported Goods
Severity (3). Again, this is not as severe because BCA could redo their budget.
Occurrence (5). Economic recession causes the US to raise money through many
different avenues, this being one of them.
Detection (1). Boeing has employees to keep current on the financial policies that will
affect their company.
4.3.16 KAI Deliberately Underperforms
Severity (4). This could hurt BCA in the long run of continual underperformance.
However, if it is just enough to go undetected, it is probably not as severe.
Occurrence (3). KAI does not have much incentive to cheat a good relationship with
Boeing.
Detection (8). It is hard for BCA to detect whether a firm is morally conscience in this
respect before entering into a relationship with them.
4.3.17 KAI Goes Bankrupt
Severity (10). This would ruin BCA's production. They would go into their backup
stock, but would have to scramble to find a new supplier. A scrambled decision would
most likely be a bad one.
Occurrence (2). There is a very small chance that KAI will not be able to manage their
assets well.
Detection (10). BCA has no way of knowing whether KAI would go bankrupt before
entering into contract.
4.3.18 Intellectual Property is Stolen
Severity (8). Losing these designs would be very harmful to BCA's Research and
Development.
Occurrence (1). It is unlikely that KAI would sell out BCA's design, because of their
contract.
Detection (10). BCA would have no way of judging KAI's morals on this issue before
entering into contract.
4.3.19 Oil Prices Increase
Severity (4). This would effect BCA's budget, but not in a drastic way.
Occurrence (10). Oil prices have been continually increasing.
Detection (1). BCA would have employees who would need to find information about
the increase in oil prices, especially with their primary products being transportation
devices.
4.4 Discussion of Feasibility
After prioritizing the risks based on RPN, the next step was to come up with plans of
action for these risks without looking into what resources BCA would have. Some of the risks
were very similar and therefore had similar plans of action. Next, the feasibility of the plan was
contemplated, taking BCA's available resources into consideration. With a large company such
as Boeing, resources are very abundant, and therefore, the plan of action is feasible in almost
every case.
However, the most common plan of action was to find another supplier in the event of
some of these risks. BCA does outsource their products to other suppliers. In this case, the
vertical fin was produced by both XAC and KAI. In the event of these risks preventing either of
the two suppliers from producing up to the level needed, BCA can call upon one to ramp up
production while the other is having difficulties. This is more motivation for BCA to outsource
to KAI, as they would provide a safety net for XAC and vice versa.
After reviewing the feasibility, KAI looks to be a good potential supplier. By
recommendation of this analysis, KAI should be considered further by the decision committee.
4.5 Reflection on Case Study
This case study does provide some benefit to the clarification of using FMEA as a way to
analyze outsourcing risks. This example analysis provides Boeing with a template for how this
analysis could be applied. It also complements Mroczkowski's thesis, as all of the issues were
taken from the issues he considered in his case study. By using this analysis with the Integrated
Decision Support Model, Boeing will have a more complete understanding of tools to use in their
decision process.
The major drawback is that the case study only provides an example. It does not prove
the concept, because it was just my thoughts on what Boeing could be thinking in a decision.
The ideal situation would be for a group of Boeing employees to go through this analysis. The
employees would have to currently be making an outsourcing decision, and would therefore be
in need of a tool to help them sort their discussions. After going through the analysis, they
would be able to provide feedback, which I would then incorporate into subsequent updates on
the analysis. This would provide Boeing with a better tool for their decisions.
5 CONCLUSION
The chapter provides the conclusions drawn from this thesis. Section 5.1 gives a description of a
test plan for this analysis in the future. Section 5.2 outlines the benefits this analysis will have
for Boeing, as well as how it could be incorporated with the Integrated Decision Support Model.
Section 5.3 reflects on what I have learned during this process. Finally, Section 5.4 provides a
brief summary of the thesis.
5.1 Future Plans
The conclusion of the case study left an open area for the further improvement of this
idea. For future study, an experiment on the effectiveness of the Outsourcing Risk FMEA would
be beneficial. This would include using a control group from any company (preferably Boeing,
but this is not a requirement) who would be making an outsourcing decision. They would
complete the analysis as described in this thesis with a proctor who is familiar with the analysis.
After completing the analysis, the proctor would prompt the group to give feedback about the
effectiveness of Outsourcing Risk FMEA. This feedback would be specific to which parts of the
FMEA need more improvements. The suggested improvements would then be used to update
the FMEA. A supplementary experiment with the updated Outsourcing Risk FMEA would be
necessary until the group finds the FMEA very useful in their decision making process.
5.2 Benefits to Boeing
This tool can be used to help Boeing make their outsourcing decisions. It provides
Boeing with a systematic way to determine risky supplier relationships. It forces the team in
charge of the outsourcing decision to consider more issues in their evaluations of suppliers. It
motivates them to research the supplier, as the analysis would not be completed without research.
Most importantly, this tool provides a standard way that Boeing can evaluate the risks associated
with outsourcing across all disciplines. Standardization is one way a large company, such as
Boeing, can operate more efficiently and effectively.
This analysis provides Boeing with a tool to complement the Integrated Decision Support
Model. In this model, Boeing employees evaluate the issues described in section 4.2 on a
numerical scale from -5 to 5. In the results of Outsourcing Risk FMEA, the team is provided
with a prioritized list of risks. The prioritized list will help the team in determining the score for
each risk on the Integrated Decision Support Model's -5 to 5 scale. Higher priority risks receive
higher scores, as they affect the company more drastically.
5.3 Reflection on Learning
5.3.1 FMEA and Outsourcing
I learned a great deal about Failure Mode and Effect Analysis. This knowledge
will not only help me in future engineering analyses I will be performing, but I also now
have a tool that I know how to apply in decision making situations. I have a much deeper
understanding of the issues a business needs to consider when making outsourcing
decisions. My current career goal is to go into engineering management. Therefore at
some point in my career, I will most likely be placed on a team that would need to be
making these decisions. Having a stronger comprehension of the factors that need to be
considered would aid this decision process, and also aid the management of it. Along
with an insight of analysis that can be performed to structure the decision, these concepts
would help my group and I be successful.
5.3.2 Accomplishment
A more poignant takeaway from this thesis is a sense of accomplishment in
creating a new analysis for a company. Being able to take an engineering analysis and
apply it to a business setting combines both of my interests. Because of that, this process
was enjoyable. Being able to design an analysis that would provide benefit to Boeing, as
well as many other companies, gives me pride in knowing that I have helped aided them
in making these difficult decisions.
5.4 Summary
This thesis explored the development of applying Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
(FMEA) to outsourcing decisions, specifically in the risk sector. The beginning of the thesis
gives an overview of what a company does when deciding to outsource. Because there is little
standardization in consideration of risks, an opportunity to develop a structured method
presented itself. The thesis then explored the concept of Failure Mode and Effect Analysis. It
looked at its current applications, and its potential for being used to analyze risks in outsourcing
decisions. After deciding that FMEA was a good method for these decisions, a new application,
called Outsourcing Risk FMEA, was developed. The thesis outlines the development process
and the details of the Outsourcing Risk FMEA procedure. A case study was conducted where
Outsourcing Risk FMEA was applied to Boeing Commercial Airlines' 2003 decision to
outsource their 737 vertical fin to Korea Aerospace Initiatives. The result of the case study
provided Boeing with an example that they could use as a template for further analysis. The
drawback to the study was that there was no feedback generated from Boeing. A future
experimental setup to obtain feedback from Boeing was discussed. This analysis provides a
structured, standard method for companies to contemplate risks in their outsourcing decisions.
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APPENDIX A: SAMPLE RISKS AND QUESTIONS ASKED IN DEVELOPMENT OF
ANALYSIS
Possible Risk: political turmoil
Questions to ask:
How will this effect production?
Will we have access to the firm to give direction/fix problems/answer questions?
Will we have access to product delivery?
How do we maintain communication?
What will happen to proprietary information?
Possible Risk: quality of outsourced product not up to scale
Questions to ask:
How will this affect our final product?
Is collaboration possible to bring other firm up to standards?
Should we move to another firm?
How often will this occur?
How was this able to be prevented?
Possible Risk: transportation time too long
Questions to ask:
How will this affect our final product?
Will this extend the final product delivery?
Is there a more reliable transportation method available?
How often will this occur?
Are we able to account for this earlier?
Themes from questions:
**degree of consequences
*likelihood of finding a solution
*likelihood of occurring
*information availability- from problem to company and company to outsource firm (to fix)
*ability to predict
APPENDIX B: TEMPLATES FOR PRIORIZATION AND MITIGATION TABLES
Team
Members:
Name of Part to be
Outsourced:
Name of Considered
Supplier:
PRIORIZATION TABLE
Issues
(Controllable,
Uncontrollable)
Risk
(based
on
issues)
Causes
of Risks
Effects
of Risk
Severity
(S)
Occurrence
(0)
Detection
(D) RPN
Team Members:
Name of Part to be
Outsourced:
Name of Considered
Supplier:
MITIGATION TABLE
Prioritized List
Plan of Action (without
considering resources)
Feasibility of Plan of
Action
APPENDIX C: INSTRUCTIONS FOR USING OUTSOURCING RISK FMEA
Outsourcing Risk FMEA Instructions
1. Gather group of people who will be essential in outsourcing decisions.
2. List a series of controllable and uncontrollable issues to consider while making outsourcing
decisions. (start using Prioritization Table)
a. Controllable issues should include, but are not limited to, issues within the following 4
categories: cost, quality (technology, experience, reputation), delivery (capacity,
reliability) and collaboration (communication, culture, information transfer).
b. Uncontrollable issues include any event that will affect the company and they cannot
control (ex. natural disasters, terrorism, exchange rate fluctuation). These issues do
not have specific categories.
c. In deciding these issues, it is important to keep in mind the scope of the decision being
made. Make sure the issues being discussed are relevant to the area being looked at.
3. List specific risks associated with the written issues.
a. Make sure that risks are case-specific to the decision. (ex. "hurricane destroys plant" is
not a relevant uncontrollable natural disaster risk for a desert area.)
b. ex. "plant produces parts that are not within specifications" is a specific risk for the
controllable quality issue
4. For each risk, list the possible causes of the situation occurring.
a. ex. "plant produces parts that are not within specifications" could be caused by
inaccurate tooling.
5. For each risk, identify and list the possible effects of the situation occurring.
a. ex. "plant produces parts that are not within specifications" will probably cause those
parts to be assembled incorrectly in the larger product.
6. Identify the Severity (S) rating.
a. This rating refers to the severity of the effects from the event on the company.
Rating Meaning
1 company is not affected
2
3 company minimally affected, repaired easily
4
5 company affected, but repairable
6
7
8 company largely affected, repairable, but difficult
9
10 company is affected beyond repair
Other numbers are scaled in between, as deemed fit by the discussion panel.
7. Identify the Occurrence (0) rating.
a. This rating refers to the how often the event will be taking place.
Rating Meaning
1 occurs very minimally (Probability < 0.10)
2 0.10 < Probability < 0.17
3 occurs a little amount (0.17 < Probability< 0.25)
4 0.25 < Probability < 0.32
5 occurs a substantial amount (0.32 < Probability < 0.40)
6 0.40 < Probability < 0.45
7 0.45 < Probability < 0.50
8 occurs rather frequently (0.5 < Probability < 0.55)
9 0.55 < Probability < 0.62
10 occurs very frequently (Probability > 0.7)
And the other numbers are scaled in between as deemed fit by the discussion panel.
8. Identify the Detection (D) rating.
a. This rating departs from traditional FMEA. The detection rating refers to the
company's ability to properly identify the risks they are discussing. The panel must
reflect on their own level of understanding of the risk being talked about and whether
they have the information to understand it fully. In order to be completely certain, the
company must already have the information necessary to make an informed decision
about the risks involved. The ratings are as follows:
Ratin Meaning
1 certain understanding, already have available information
2
3 fair understanding, do not have information, fairly easy to obtain
4
5 mediocre understanding, do not have information, obtainable, but slightly difficult
6
7
8 unclear understanding, do not have information, will be rather difficult to obtain
9
10 no understanding, do not have information, not available
Other numbers are scaled in between the described ones.
9. Calculate the Risk Priority Number (RPN).
a. RPN=SxOxD
b. The RPN will assign values to the risks from 1-1000.
10. Prioritize the risks and move the list of prioritized risks to the Mitigation Table.
a. The risks with the highest RPN are the most critical in considering when making the
final decision. They go to the top of the list, which are rewritten on the new Table.
11. Discuss and list possible plan of actions. (on Mitigation Table)
a. The team will discuss the risks associated with the sourcing decision, using the FMEA
output as a guide for the discussion. The most crucial risks will be discussed first and
for the longest time available.
b. For each risk, the team will come up with a plan of action that would reduce or
eliminate the risk in question. *DO NOT take into account the resources the
company has.
12. Discuss feasibility of plan of action.
a. The team will discuss each plan of action now keeping in mind the company's
resources. It will determine whether the company has the means of mitigating the
risk in question.
13. Review the analysis.
a. At the end of the session, the company will review the feasibility of mitigating the risks
discussed. This will hopefully lead to a better sourcing decision.
**This tool does not provide any type decision. It only prioritizes the risks that need to be
considered.
APPENDIX D: COMPLETED PRIORITIZATION AND MITIGATION TABLES FOR
BOEING 737 VERTICAL FIN CASE STUDY
**Tables begin on next page due to landscape format.
Team N/A Example
Members: Study
Name of Part to be Outsourced:
Name of Considered Supplier:
Page 1 of 5
PRIORIZATION TABLE
Boeing 737 Vertical Fin
Korea Aerospace Industries
Issues
(Controllable, Risks (based on Severity Occurrence Detection
Uncontrollable) issues) Causes of Risk Effects of Risk (S) (0) (D) RPN
Better Fabrication competing competitors are
Techology Technology companies have able to steal
Clockspeed Emerges better R&D market 9 1 2 18
part is unable to
manufacturing be used until
1.KAI does not errors, has wrong KAI is able to
Product/Process Produce Correct design produce correct
Architecture Parts specifications parts 10 2 5 100
does not have part is unable to
experience with be manufactured
this type of until KAI can
2. KAI Unable to product, machines handle the
Handle Complexity are old/outdated complexity 8 2 2 32
1. KAI Does Not similar to above, part unable to be
Have the machines manufactured
Supply Base Capabilities to outdated, plant until KAI fixes
Characteristics Produce space is limited capabilities 10 1 1 10
Team N/A Example
Members: Study
Name of Part to be Outsourced:
Name of Considered Supplier:
Page 2 of 5
PRIORIZATION TABLE
Boeing 737 Vertical Fin
Korea Aerospace Industries
Issues
(Controllable, Risks (based on Severity Occurrence Detection
Uncontrollable) issues) Causes of Risk Effects of Risk (S) (0) (D) RPN
downstream KAI does not
suppliers fail due receive supplies
to any number of it needs, so
2. KAI's controllable or cannot produce
Downstream Supply uncontrollable part that BCA
Base Fails forces, needs 7 4 9 252
Competitive Pricing manufacturing
for Product Makes competition is then becomes
Enterprise Manufacturing abundant and too expensive
Characteristics Unaffordable drives cost down with KAI 6 1 3 18
customers believe demand for
Customers Do Not outsourced parts product
Want Outsourced have less quality decreases, lose
Customer Value Parts and reliability customer loyalty 5 4 2 40
part unable to be
manufactured
Exogeneous Korea Shuts political factors until situation is
Forces Production Down (overthrow, etc.) cleared 10 1 1 10
Team N/A Example
Members: Study
Name of Part to be Outsourced:
Name of Considered Supplier:
Page 3 of 5
PRIORIZATION TABLE
Boeing 737 Vertical Fin
Korea Aerospace Industries
Issues
(Controllable, Risks (based on Severity Occurrence Detection
Uncontrollable) issues) Causes of Risk Effects of Risk (S) (0) (D) RPN
BCA will
production continually be
capabilites are behind on
Demand slow, meeting
Forecast KAI Cannot Meet old/unreliable customer
Accuracy Demand for Product machines demand 7 2 4 56
BCA will be
like above, behind in their
production aircraft
capabilities are production until
slow, KAI production
KAI Production old/unreliable is back on
Velocity Time Increases machines schedule 3 7 4 84
batch is
discarded, go
Batch of Parts Does manufacturing into reserve fins
Quality Not Meet Design errors if necessary 4 8 2 64
deplete backup
fins, plane
KAI Fails to Deliver production time production
Delivery On Time increased slowed 5 6 3 90
N/A Example
Team Members: Study
Name of Part to be Outsourced:
Name of Considered Supplier:
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PRIORIZATION TABLE
Boeing 737 Vertical Fin
Korea Aerospace Industries
Issues (Controllable, Risks (based on Severity Occurrence Detection
Uncontrollable) issues) Causes of Risk Effects of Risk (S) (0) (D) RPN
old machines, part unable to be
KAI Does Not Have poor design, manufactured
the Resources to people are not until resources
Capacity Produce available are procured 8 1 1 8
Production Cost per
Unit
Transportation/Logistics
Cost
Investment Cost
number of
external factors,
not necessarily budget is not
just one, failures accurate unless
Supplier Management Costs Increase discussed above it can be fixed
Cost Quickly are costly to fix quickly 4 8 2 64
budget is not
accurate, but can
be fixed
New Tariff Raised relatively
Tax Impact on Imported Goods political factors quickly 3 5 1 15
N/A Example
Team Members: Study
Name of Part to be Outsourced:
Name of Considered Supplier:
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PRIORIZATION TABLE
Boeing 737 Vertical Fin
Korea Aerospace Industries
Issues
(Controllable, Risks (based on Severity Occurrence Detection
Uncontrollable) issues) Causes of Risk Effects of Risk (S ) (D) RPN
BCA might not
moral factors, realize initially,
incentives to cheat slowly effects
Supply/Dependency 1. KAI Deliberately (money, peer total production
Risk Underperforms pressure, etc.) time 4 3 7 84
unable to manage BCA needs to
2. KAI Goes money, KAI's scramble to find
Bankrupt suppliers fail new supplier 10 2 10 200
BCA's design is
compromised,
outside group competitive
Enterprise System Intellectual Property offers KAI money advantage is
Breakdown is Stolen for BCA's design taken away 10 1 10 100
external factors budget is not
Uncontrollable (war, global accurate, effects
Risks Oil Prices Increase economy, etc.) shipping costs 4 10 2 80
Team Members:
Name of Part to be Outsourced:
Name of Considered Supplier:
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MITIGATION TABLE
N/A Example Study
Boeing 737 Vertical Fin
Korea Aerospace Industries
Feasibility of
Plan of Action (without considering Plan of
Prioritized List resources) Action
(252) KAI's Downstream Supply send employees to KAI to help,
Base Fails control further downstream yes, no
yes, but
(200) KAI Goes Bankrupt find other suppliers harder
(100) KAI does not Produce Correct provide support to KAI to get back yes, yes but
Parts on track, find other supplier hard
yes, probably
(100) Intellectual Property is Stolen lawsuit, try to regain IP no
go to back up supplies, provide
(90) KAI Fails to Deliver On Time support to KAI to get back on track yes, yes
provide support to KAI to develop
(84) KAI Production Time Increases faster production plan yes
enforce penalties, find other yes, yes but
(84)KAI Deliberately Underperforms suppliers hard
(80) Oil Prices Increase rebudget from other areas ye s
(64) Costs Increase Quickly rebudget from other areas yes
(64) Batch of Parts Does Not Meet go to back up supplies, provide
Design support to KAI to get back on track yes, yes
send employees to diagnose
problem, work with KAI to develop(56) KAI Cannot Meet Demand for faster production time, find new yes, yes but
Product supplier hard
use more domestic parts in other yes but may
(40) Customers Do Not Want areas, make people more aware of not be
Outsourced Parts quality willing, yes
send employees to provide support
(32) KAI Unable to Handle with manufacturing, find other yes, yes but
Complexity supplier hard
(18) Better Fabrication Technology yes but
Emerges develop new technology in house difficult
yes but
(18 )Competitive Pricing for Product should fall on
Makes Manufacturing Unaffordable redesign manufacturing KAI
Team Members:
Name of Part to be Outsourced:
Name of Considered Supplier:
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MITIGATION TABLE
Prioritized List
(15) New Tariff Raised on Imported
Goods
(10) KAI Does Not Have the
Capabilities to Produce
(10) Korea Shuts Production Down
(8) KAI Does Not Have the
Resources to Produce
N/A Example Study
Boeing 737 Vertical Fin
Korea Aerospace Industries
Plan of Action (without considering
resources)
rebudget from other areas
find other suppliers
work with country's government to
a point, then find other suppliers
help KAI procure resources
(money, connections, etc.), find
other supplier
Feasibility of
Plan of
Action
yes
yes but hard
yes but hard
(both)
yes but
probably
unwilling, yes
but hard
